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AIRLINE MERGER POLICY AND ENTRY BARRIERS: 
A LESSON EROM THE PAST
by
Matthew V. Scocozza 
McNair Law Firm
INTRODUCTION
Many criticisms have been voiced about the U.S. Department of 
Transportation's oversight of the airline merger authority under 
Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act. The Department of Trans­
portation inherited this function from the Civil Aeronautics Board on 
the occasion of that agency's sunset on December 31,1984. On 
January 1, 1989, Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act was sunset. 
Airline mergers are now governed by the general antitrust laws of 
the United States as administered by the U.S. Department of Justice.
This paper is designed to give an inside look at each of the 
mergers approved during the DOT era as well as the basis upon 
which the decisions were made. Since review of barriers to entry 
was of critical importance in the DOT review process, a primary 
focus of this paper will be on barriers to entry. Since this paper will 
touch upon acquisitions as well as mergers, I will use the term 
"merger" to refer to both types of transactions.
This document will respond to criticisms voiced in the past as 
well as review the important market by market analyses undertaken 
by staff and decisionmakers. All too often critics have been quick to 
judge the DOT perion of merger review by the "numbers" of cases 
approved, revised, or disapproved. Responsible reviews of the 
decisions should be made after an analysis of the specific circum-
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stances surrounding each case. Only when there is a clear and 
informed understanding of past merger decisions can there be a 
sound basis for the continued development of airline merger policy.
This paper will also briefly address two other developments that 
some may argue should play a greater role in entry barrier analysis in 
the airline industry -- airline owned computer reservations systems 
or "CRSs" and special arrangements, referred to as code-sharing 
agreements, between large carriers and selected smaller feeder 
carriers. These developments may also have relevance to the 
discussion on exclusionary conduct which follows.
AIRLINE MERGER POLICY AND ENTRY BARRIERS
The CAB's and Department's review of airline mergers has been 
governed by Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.1 
Section 408 (b) establishes the standard for review that is to be 
applied. Before deregulation, Section 408 (b) conferred on the CAB 
broad discretion to approve or disapprove airline mergers under a 
"public interest" test. Maintenance of competition was not always 
the CAB's highest priority in applying this test When Congress 
enacted the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,2 it amended Section 
408 to reflect its decision that the airline industry should be gov­
erned by the forces of the marketplace, not by federal economic 
regulations. Although Congress retained the public interest test, it 
added a specific competitive test3 Section 408 required the Depart­
ment to approve a merger 1) that will not result in a monopoly or 
further an attempted monopoly and that will not likely lessen com­
petition substantially in any region of the United States and 2) that is 
not inconsistent with the public interest Section 408 requires the 
Department to disapprove a merger that does not meet these 
standards, unless DOT found that it met significant transportation 
needs and conveniences of the public that cannot be met through 
any reasonably available alternative transaction that would be
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materially less anti-competitive.4 Parties challenging a transaction 
bore the burden of proving its anti-competitive effects.5
The competitive test of Section 408 was very similar to that of 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. For the record, the CAB and DOT 
have never approved an anti-competitive merger under the trans­
portation needs and conveniences test. The Department, therefore, 
applied standards established under Section 7 in their review of 
airline mergers. Under Section 7, review of a merger must consist of 
a "functional analysis" which includes a consideration of an indus­
try's structure, history and future, according to the Brown Shoe and 
General Dynamics decisions and their progeny.6
In reviewing mergers, the CAB and, DOT attempted to deter­
mine whether the merger would provide carriers market power 
enabling them to charge fares above, or reduce service below, 
competitive levels. This is also the central inquiry in Clayton Act 
cases in other industries. However, the method of analysis for other 
industries frequently may differ from that employed for the airline 
industry. Most Clayton Act cases involve industries where new entry 
is unlikely. The courts therefore assume that a significant increase in 
market shares or concentration statistics substantial lessening of 
competition unless the proponents of a merger can show otherwise. 
In contrast, both the CAB and the Department have found that high 
concentration statistics are not themselves reliable indicators of 
market power in the airline industry, especially concentration 
statistics in individual city-pair markets. This position was based on 
the belief that in the absence of constraints on entry, carriers can 
enter individual city-pair markets relatively easily. Before deregula­
tion proved to be one of the biggest constraints on entry. Once this 
barrier was removed, the threat of potential entry could discipline 
the service of carriers actually in a market. This belief in turn was 
not based solely on theoretical musing, but on the CAB's real-world 
observations in some of its earliest decisions such as the National 
Acquisition and the Texas International-Continental Cases that
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“Airline markets are nearly always concentrated by traditional 
antitrust standards, yet most are competitive in performance."7 
Therefore, in the CAB merger cases cited (among others), and in 
concentrated on the Department's own merger decisions, such as 
the Southwest-Muse and Northwest-Republic cases, bother agencies 
concentrated on determining whether any entry barriers that would 
justify inferring a loss of competition from a substantial increase in 
concentration existed in the specific markets at issue.8 And since the 
agencies drew no presumptions from concentration statistics, they 
looked to merger opponents to demonstrate the existence of entry 
barriers or otherwise to show anti-competitive effects. The Depart­
ment discussed this issue at some length in the Northwest-Republic 
case.9
One of the most significant developments in airline operations 
in a deregulated environment has been the establishment of hub- 
and-spoke route networks. In hub-and-spoke networks, airlines 
serve many routes emanating from a common hub. By combining 
local traffic flying between the hub and each spoke end-point with 
traffic flying between different end-points, airlines lower their per 
passenger costs of operating any specific flight segment. Hub and 
spoke operations permit airlines to serve smaller local markets that 
could not sustain service with local traffic alone. In addition, airlines 
compete vigorously with each other for passengers moving between 
the same pairs of spoke end-points by offering single-plane or 
connecting service over alternate hubs. The growth of hub and 
spoke operations have clearly benefited many airline customers. 
However, it has also generated controversy in airline merger cases.
Since one of the CAB's earliest merger decisions under the 
Deregulation Act, opponents, including the Justice Department in 
some cases, have contended that the efficiencies of hubbing are so 
substantial that control of feed or “hub dominance" is an entry 
barrier in hub city-pair markets. The CAB never seriously doubted 
that access to feed was a relative efficiency factor that could reduce 
a hubbing carrier's per passenger costs. However, the CAB also
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found, based on the evidence before it, that other factors — such as 
lower operating costs, strong local traffic demand, reliance on one- 
stop or connecting service to compete with non-stop service, or feed 
from their own hubs — would permit carriers to enter successfully 
hub city-pair markets served by a carrier with hub dominance. 
Therefore, the CAB consistently concluded that the benefits of feed 
were not so large as to preclude the threat of competition from 
disciplining a carrier with hub dominance. Again, the CAB's conclu­
sion was based on hard evidence from the real world. In each case, 
the Board had before it examples of carriers actually serving hub 
city-pair markets that they should not have been serving if hub 
dominance really were a barrier to entry. The National Acquisition 
and Continental-Western merger cases are good examples.10
The hub dominance issue was hotly contested in DOT merger 
cases as well, especially those involving combinations of carriers that 
had hubbing operations in the same city, such as the Northwest- 
Republic (Minneapolis/St. Paul and Detroit) and TWA-Ozark (St. 
Louis) cases.11 The Justice Department opposed each of these 
mergers. In approving them, the Department determined that the 
record did not support the Justice Department's contention that 
competitors could not use other advantages, such as those outlined 
above, to match the benefits of hub - dominance and enter the hub 
carrier's markets. Again, the Department had evidence of carriers 
actually operating where they should not have been if hub domi­
nance really impeded entry.12
Some observers have made much of the fact the Justice Depart­
ment and Department of Transportation took such diametrically 
opposed positions on these mergers. I think these observers have 
read more into these differences then they fairly should. Out of 
twenty-odd major merger decisions by the Department, the TWA- 
Ozark and Northwest-Republic transactions were the only two that 
the Department approved when the Justice Department urged 
outright disapproval.13 The Justice Department reached its position 
in part because it relied on the traditional antitrust notion that
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increased concentration implies loss of competition and in part 
because it believed that one-stop or connecting service was not 
competitive with non-stop service. DOT did not find that the record 
supported either contention. At the risk of oversimplifying, DOT 
found its expertise in the airline industry, supported by the records 
in the cases, to be a more reliable than the Justice Department's 
general antitrust expertise.
The hub dominance issue arose again in the USAir-Piedmont 
case, even though there were no overlapping hubs.14 The Justice 
Department did not challenge the merger, but another carrier, the 
America West Airlines did. The carrier submitted evidence on the 
correlation of fare levels in individual city-pair markets to a dominant 
carrier's share of enplanements at the end points of the city-pairs. It 
claimed that this statistical analysis showed that hub dominance 
provided market power to allow the dominant carrier to raise fares.
In addition, its experts claimed that various business practices that 
arose in the deregulated environment -- such as frequent flyer 
programs, CRSs, override commissions for travel agents and sophisti­
cated discount fare capacity control programs -- might give such 
large advantage to hubbing airline as to be barriers to entry in hub 
city-pair markets. I believe that they may have been following a lead 
suggested by Professor Mike Levine in his article in the Yale lournal 
on Regulation.15
The Department carefully reviewed these contentions and the 
record in the case. It found that the statistical analysis was flawed 
and therefore could not be relied on to demonstrate that hub 
dominance conferred market power. With respect to Professor 
Levine's article, I think he has raised some interesting theoretical and 
analytical questions which probably deserve consideration in the 
review of any future airline mergers. However, the Department 
makes its, merger decision based on the characteristics of the airlines 
and the markets in the particular case before it. In the USAir- 
Piedmont case, the Department found that any competitive advan­
tages that the business practices gave to USAir or Piedmont were not
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so large as to make the practices entry barriers in the markets 
affected by the USAir-Piedmont transaction. I don't think anyone 
would seriously argue that the ability of a carrier like American to 
offer frequent flyers free travel to numerous European and Carib­
bean destinations also allows it to compete effectively against USAir's 
frequent-flyer program, even in cities like Syracuse where USAir 
enjoys a strong presence. Some of these business practices may even 
facilitate entry or expansion.
Limitations on airport access are the other potential entry barrier 
that the CAB and DOT have most frequently considered in merger 
cases. These limitations may take two forms: (1) the lack of terminal 
or other ground facilities to accommodate increased service; and (2) 
regulatory ceilings on the number of flights permitted to operate at 
an airport. Federal restrictions on the number of operations at four 
airports ("slots") — Laguardia and John F. Kennedy International 
airports in New York, Chicago O'Hare and Washington National — 
are the most well known of the latter category, but some airports 
have succeeded in imposing their own limits as well.
Limitations on terminal facilities have been most frequently cited 
by merger opponents as entry barriers in cases where hub domi­
nance was also a central issue, such as the Continental-Western, 
Northwest-Republic, and TWA-Ozark cases. In each of these cases 
opponents argued that a potential entrant needed the ability to es­
tablish its own hub at the affected city in order to exercise effective 
competitive discipline over the merging carrier's hub operation and 
that there were insufficient ground facilities to permit a new hub. 
Generally speaking, the agencies have agreed that the affected 
airports did not have adequate facilities to permit immediate entry 
on a hub scale. However, the agencies found that there were 
adequate facilities to permit entry on a lesser scale. As the earlier 
discussion of hub dominance suggests, the agencies also found the 
threat of entry on less than a hub scale to be sufficient to provide 
effective competitive discipline. Therefore, the agencies have not
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found limitations on airport ground facilities to be entry barriers.16 In 
the TWA-Ozark case, one carrier, Southwest Airlines, did have 
access to sufficient ground facilities to support a hubbing operation.
When the Department considered whether slots are an entry 
barrier it usually focused on the New York and Washington slot- 
controlled airports. Each of these airports serves a metropolitan area 
that also receives substantial air service through at least one airport 
that is not under slot restrictions. With one exception, the records 
before the Department showed that services at the airports without 
slot constraints were part of the same market as services at the slot- 
constrained airports. Therefore, existing or potential service at the 
unrestricted airports provided competitive discipline for services at 
the slot constrained airports. The Department accordingly found 
that slots were not an entry barrier requiring disapproval of the 
mergers. The USAir-Piedmont case is an example.
The exception which proves the rule, the Texas Air-Eastern case, 
involved unique circumstances. The merger involved the combina­
tion of the two competitors in the Northeast Corridor air shuttle 
markets (Washington National-Laguardia and Laguardia-Boston).
The Department found that these markets were airport specific and 
that a competitor would have to provide hourly service to compete 
effectively in the markets. The Department found that in these 
circumstances slots were an entry barrier and it refused to approve 
the acquisition until the applicants gave up enough slots to Pan 
American to mount a competitive shuttle operation.17 In this case, 
the Department agreed with the Justice Department that there were 
competitive problems that needed to be fixed before the transaction 
could be approved.
Before turning away from mergers I would like to address two 
points recently raised by critics of past merger policy. First, they 
suggest that the relative stability in market shares of merging carriers 
at their hubs indicates that their hub dominance has insulated them
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from competition. Second, they suggest that recent trends toward 
fare increases may be manifestations of a loss of competition in the 
industry. To infer a lessening of competition in the airline industry 
from either phenomenon requires a leap of faith that isn't justified.
Concerning market shares, as even the Justice Department 
acknowledges, immediate new entry is not required, and should not 
be expected, in order to exert competitive discipline on incumbents 
in an airline market. Three hubs affected by DOT approved mergers, 
Minneapolis St. Paul, Detroit and St. Louis has each seen entry by 
new carriers and expansion by incumbents other than the merging 
carriers. As to fares, the downward movement in fares for much of 
the last two years coincided with dramatic decreases in the price of 
aviation fuel, which is the second largest component of airline 
operating expenses. In recent months, aviation fuel prices have 
stabilized or started to rise. In addition, many airlines have made 
commitments for, or started to take delivery on, large orders for new 
aircraft. These aircraft must be paid for. Thus, the recent upward 
trend in fares reflect no more than a change in airline cost structures
Turning to CRSs, the affiliations of the five U.S. travel agent CRSs 
with airlines has been a subject of controversy ever since the CAB 
first examined the issue. In its CRS rulemaking,18 the CAB found that 
CRS operators used their CRSs to increase their share of sales by 
agents subscribing to their CRS services at the expense of their airline 
competitors. This phenomenon is referred to as the generation of 
incremental revenues. The CAB found that by generating incre­
mental revenues, CRS operators could reduce their own unit costs of 
providing airline service while raising the costs of their airline 
competitors. The CAB also found that airline economics and 
distribution practices required airlines to be listed in any CRS that 
had gained significant penetration in the travel agent industry. 
Therefore, the CAB found that CRSs were analogous to essential 
facilities under the antitrust laws.
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Based on its findings, the CAB adopted regulations that reduced 
CRS Operators' ability to generate incremental revenues with their 
systems.19 The rules also required the operators to give access to 
their CRSs to other airlines on non-discriminatory terms and at non- 
discriminatory prices.20
The CRS rulemaking has proven to be far from the last word on 
CRSs. A number of airlines have filed private antitrust actions against 
the airline affiliates of the largest CRSs, American and United.21 A 
key issue in those cases is whether CRSs should be classified as 
essential facilities.
As I noted earlier, the opponent of the USAir-Piedmont merger 
argued that CRSs might be an entry barrier. The Department 
rejected this argument in part because neither USAir nor Piedmont 
at that time owned a CRS. Since the Department's decision, USAir 
has agreed to join a group of four foreign airlines to purchase a fifty- 
percent interest in United's CRS.22
The Department very recently issued its study of the CRS 
industry. The Department's study is probably the most comprehen­
sive -- it is certainly the longest -- since the CAB's rulemaking. 
Nevertheless, I do not believe that the study itself can answer all 
questions about the current effects of airline-CRS affiliation in entry 
barrier analysis for airline mergers. Among other things, the study 
suggests that CRSs continue to generate some incremental revenues 
for their airline affiliates, but precise determination of the amounts 
and causes of incremental revenues was not possible. CRSs also 
earn substantial fee payments from airlines that are listed in their 
displays. It would not, however, be fair to infer from these findings 
alone that CRSs benefit their airline affiliates so much that competi­
tive discipline in the airline industry has been materially eroded.
Even if CRSs do create some advantages for their airline affiliates, 
they also provide other carriers with convenient, quick and reliable 
access to the nationwide distribution network represented by travel
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agents. To the extent that CRS participation allows carriers to avoid 
using other more costly distribution methods, CRSs may enhance 
competition.23
Code-sharing agreements also have been the subject of much 
discussion lately. Code-sharing agreements are arrangements in 
which a commuter carrier's flights are listed in schedules and CRSs 
under the airline designator code of a large jet operator. The large 
airline usually enters into these agreements to provide additional 
feed support from smaller communities to its hubs. In addition to 
sharing codes, the commuter services will often be marketed under a 
trade name closely aligned with the name of the jet carrier, for 
example American Eagle or United Express. Connecting flights 
between the parties to code-sharing agreements receive the same 
priority as true single-carrier connections in CRS schedule displays.
In addition, the jet operators offer joint fare arrangements to their 
code-sharing partners that are more favorable than those they offer 
to other commuters.
Although they have been part of the industry since the 1960's 
they had not generated much controversy until the 1980's when 
they began to proliferate. You need only look at the comments on 
code-sharing in two rulemaking dockets, CAB Dockets 42199 and 
41686 to appreciate the intensity of this controversy.24 Independent 
commuters have claimed that they cannot effectively compete 
against code-sharing commuters because of the benefits of improved 
CRS listings and the special joint fare arrangements. When the 
Department completed its study of code-sharing in early 198625 the 
evidence available to it did not support these contentions. The data 
relied on at that time suggested that independent commuters 
continued to play a substantial role in serving smaller communities 
and that they were effectively competing head-to-head against code­
sharing commuters in many markets. However, later data suggested 
that the benefits of code-sharing may place independent commuters 
at a disadvantage, and that independents are declining as a force in 
the market.26
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Although code-sharing arrangements may increase the costs or 
risks of entry by independent commuters, I believe it is fair to 
consider them as much entry tools as entry barriers. Increasingly, jet 
operators are including code-sharing arrangements as part of their 
program for establishing new hubs. United arranged for initiation of 
United Express service at American Eagle service when it opened its 
Raleigh-Durham and Nashville hubs. The Department has found in 
a number of merger decisions, including the Northwest-Republic 
and Alaska Airlines- Horizon cases,27 that participation in a code­
sharing arrangement may facilitate a commuter carrier's entry or 
expansion into markets around a hub.
CONCLUSION
The sponsors have reminded me that the purpose of this 
symposium is to suggest lessons that general antitrust practitioners 
might draw from the experiences of deregulated industries. Let me 
close by suggesting at least one lesson to be gleaned from both the 
CAB's and Department's experiences with airline mergers. It is 
critically important for the decision-maker passing judgement on a 
merger to thoroughly understand the nature of the industry and 
markets, and the characteristics of competition and the competitors, 
and affected by a proposed merger before applying the competitive 
standards of the Clayton Act. Presumptions or even conclusions that 
have been drawn about the nature of competition for some indus­
tries or markets may not be readily transferable to others. As 
antitrust practitioners, you can best contribute to sound antitrust 
policy by assuring that the decision-maker is presented with the 
information that will permit the thorough understanding necessary 
for well-reasoned and reasonable decisions.
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